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Political ignorance is one of the most important features of the British – or any other – public. As the general
election approaches, we may be moved to ask how competent the average voter really is. But, as
Simon Kaye explains in this article, the relationship between democracy and ignorance is extremely
complicated, and calls for sophisticated political analysis.
In the run-up to a general election, it is a grand tradition for us to experience a collective crisis of
confidence over the weak political knowledge of would-be voters. The Independent‘s buzzfeed-
imitating i100 site recently set out some evidence of this sort, reporting that 46 per cent of the
respondents to a survey were unaware that a general election is taking place this year, 57 per cent
were unaware of what a general election is, and 59 per cent could not name the current British Prime Minister.
How trustworthy is this evidence? Methodologically speaking, not very trustworthy at all. As i100 noted, the 1900-
odd responses that produced these statistics were an unweighted sample, quizzed via email by a voucher codes
website. It’s likely, then, that all we are learning about here is the political ignorance of particularly savings-savvy
people with a bit of time on their hands. We should be wary of extrapolating such information into a generalised
indictment of the state of public political knowledge.
But are these statistics outliers? Do they fail to correspond with existing (more sound) empirics on similar questions?
Would an expert on public opinion be surprised by these findings? Not really. While most research around public
ignorance arises from surveys conducted in the USA, there’s a growing body of work concerned with the UK context
as well, and the majority of such evidence confirms the realism of the statistics set out above.
Recently, a survey for the Royal Statistical Society and KCL gave a powerful impression of the extent of public
ignorance over social affairs and politics, finding, among other things, that:
British people thought under-age pregnancies to be 25 times more common than they actually are
They also thought that the severity of benefit fraud is 24 times worse than in reality
29 per cent of those surveyed thought that Jobseekers’ Allowance is more expensive to the taxpayer than
pensions, when the latter costs about 15 times more
In general, people thought that crime and violent crime rates were rising, when in fact they have been falling
for decades
British people systematically over-estimated immigration rates.
These findings are particularly interesting in that they seem to indicate a kind of pessimistic bias in British political
ignorance. Is it possible that in many of these areas we imagine things to be ‘worse’ than they actually are because
of the media and cultural landscape in which we find ourselves? In a more balanced informational environment,
would we cease to be wrong, or simply cease to be wrong in a systematically pessimistic way?
But objective and depoliticised ignorance is just as persistent as that which may be explained away by the cognitive
biases of political partiality. Scientific knowledge levels are a good indicator if we are interested in measuring the
epistemic ‘competence’ of voters while controlling for the effects of systematic political misinformation, and the
scientific ignorance of the general public is measured quite frequently by polling in the UK. The evidence here is just
as worrying: a 1999 Gallup poll, for example, found that 33 per cent of British people gave the wrong answer or
claimed to have ‘no opinion’ when asked whether the Earth revolves around the sun, trailing behind people in the US
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(21 per cent ignorant) and Germany (26 per cent).
It is clear, then, that there’s no need to turn to i100‘s problematic sources if we want to get a sense of the ‘knowledge
problems’ at work in British democracy – but we needn’t dismiss those findings as unrealistic, either.
Why is this important? Concerns raised by a drastically politically ignorant public extend beyond the simple
possibility that it will make bad choices when voting. Ignorant voters may also be more easily misled or manipulated
by rhetorically impressive but factually unsound claims. They may fall back upon sources of democratic advice that
don’t quite measure up to more detailed understanding. They might be more prone to accept conspiracy theories, or
fall into patterns where they accept overly dichotomous or extremely simplified versions of reality. Why should
fundamental decisions – say, over the best political party for the management of immigration – be entrusted to a
public that is generally mistaken about the fundamental facts of immigration and demography in the UK?
This (plentifully controversial) book by Ilya Somin, among a variety of recent interventions in US political science
intended to discuss the scale and implications of political ignorance in voting publics, also explains some of the
limitations of the kinds of policies we imagine might be useful to combat ignorance. Somin suggests that education
may theoretically promote greater levels of political knowledge, but could also establish centrally-determined biases
in the way that the public perceives political problems (a problem that could, at worst, amount to ‘brainwashing’).
Jason Brennan and Bryan Caplan have argued, in different ways, for franchise limitation, suggesting that those who
vote should be those who are confident of voting well. But establishing an objective benchmark for determining
qualified voters from unqualified would be an exercise in elitism and absolutism, especially since so many political
questions do not have readily apparent ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ answers.
Deliberative and participatory democrats argue that mass democracy is an implicitly valuable practice, and one that
will necessarily result in the pooling and sharing of information. This response may be right in another way, too: by
increasing the participatory efficacy of voters, we could also incentivise them to take on more of the opportunity
costs that are accrued by the effort to become politically educated. This might add up to an argument for more direct
democracy and a more proportional electoral system, but even innovations such as these will not greatly increase
the actual importance of individual voters within a mass democracy, leaving incentive structures much as they stand
today.
The fact of public ignorance may interact in some surprising ways with the other features of political behaviour.
Within the British context, the extent of such ignorance may help us to make peace with the various systemic and
electoral features of our political establishment that make the public far less influential and more prone to apathy
than they might imagine or prefer themselves to be. After all, what’s the value of a more responsive, proportional,
direct electoral system – of more democracy – if the wider citizenry is still not strongly incentivised to vote
knoweldgeably?
Meanwhile, it seems plausible that the probability of limited information and tight epistemic constraints are factored-
in to the version of democracy practiced in the UK, where we defer to representatives for choice-making, effectively
‘outsourcing’ the costly business of political expertise to a specialised group. The ignorance and manipulations of the
political class therefore rightly become the primary subjects of our scrutiny.
Political analysis, if it is to have meaning, should take the ignorance of democratic citizens seriously – but it should
also probably take it as a non-negotiable feature of the way that democracies work in the era of mass voting publics.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the General Election blog, nor of the London
School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting. 
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